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 ABSTRACT 
  Communities differ in both the bundle of amenities offered to residents and the 
implicit price of these amenities. Thus, households are faced with a choice of which 
bundle to select when they select their residence. This choice implies households make 
tradeoffs among the amenities; that is, the amenities are substitutes or complements. We 
focus on estimating the demand for public school quality. After generating the implicit 
prices of community amenities from a hedonic house price equation, we use the median 
voter model and the AIDS model framework for estimating price and income elasticities of 
demand. The two models yield very similar estimates. The own price elasticity of demand 
for schooling is about -0.6 with an income elasticity of demand of 0.5. Public safety and 
school quality are substitutes as are the community’s income level and school quality. 
  21. INTRODUCTION 
  Estimating the demand for education is an important topic in economics. Primary 
and secondary education is an investment by parents in their children, and highly-
educated children enter the labor force with higher human capital. A number of studies 
have investigated the determinants of the demand for schooling (Rubinfeld 1977; Jud and 
Watts 1981; Brasington 2000). Surveying the literature, Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) 
report that estimates of price elasticities of demand for school quality generally range from 
–0.20 to –0.40. Bergstrom et al. (1982: 1199) report a range of -0.25 to -0.50. Previous 
studies generally find taxes negatively related and income levels positively related to the 
demand for public schooling. Cross-elasticities of the demand for school quality with other 
community attributes have not been reported. 
    Our study furthers the empirical investigation of the demand for education in two 
ways. Typically, the demand for public school quality is estimated using the median voter 
approach, this approach requiring only readily available aggregated data. However, 
empirical application of this model requires a number of assumptions that are rarely 
fulfilled. An alternative is to use a micro level data set to estimate the demand for 
education. One micro level approach to estimate the demand for public school quality is to 
use the hedonic house price model (Rosen 1974). This approach is feasible because 
public school quality is generally found to be an important determinant of the variation in 
house prices among communities (Haurin and Brasington 1996; Downes and Zabel 2002; 
Figlio and Lucas 2004; Brasington and Haurin forthcoming). While micro level house price 
transaction information is readily available, housing transaction data sets do not include 
information about household income, a critical variable. Thus, there are few hedonic 
  3model analyses of the demand for educational quality.
1 We solve this data availability 
problem by using a different approach than employs the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS).  
  After estimating the demand for education using the median voter and AIDS 
approaches, we compare the results and find that they yield very similar conclusions. We 
can therefore say with added confidence that the price elasticity of demand for public 
schooling is about -0.5, the tax elasticity of demand is smaller, about -0.2, and the income 
elasticity of demand is 0.60. We find what appear to be the first estimates of the cross 
price elasticities of demand between public school quality and other neighborhood 
attributes. Specifically, we find that school quality and living in high-income neighborhoods 
are substitutes, with a cross price elasticity of about 0.2. Public safety and school quality 
are weak substitutes, with a cross price elasticity of 0.1. The only neighborhood attribute 
with an estimated cross price elasticity that is inconsistent across AIDS and median voter 
models is racial composition. 
 
2.  THE MEDIAN VOTER APPROACH 
  A common approach to estimating the demand for a local public good or service 
such as the quality of public schools is the median voter model, whose empirical origins 
trace back to Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Using this method, the demand for quality 
schooling is assumed to be a function of the implicit price of schooling and a vector of 
characteristics of the median voter.
2 Data measuring the aggregate characteristics of 
households in a community are readily available. Goldstein and Pauly (1981) criticized the 
median voter approach, suggesting that because of imperfect Tiebout sorting (1956), the 
  4median voter should not be chosen based solely on income, and thus we estimate two 
versions of the model. The first is the traditional median voter approach and the second 
includes additional variables suggested by Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (RSR 1987) 
that mitigate Goldstein and Pauly’s “Tiebout bias”. The median voter model to be 
estimated takes the following form: 
1) log sk =  γ1 log (yk)  + γ2 log (τk)  + 
i
n
= ∑
1
γ3ik log (pik) + γ4 (zk) + ε1 
where s is school quality in the k-th community, y is median income, τ is the tax price, pi=s 
is the own price of school quality, the other pi are other goods’ prices, and z is a matrix of 
controls suggested by RSR (1987) to mitigate Tiebout bias.
3 In our analysis of substitutes 
and complements of school quality, we focus on community-level attributes such as 
community income and racial compositon. That is, recognizing that public school quality is 
selected by the choice of community, we focus on the tradeoffs a household makes 
among community attributes. In general, a household has the choice of many types and 
sizes of houses within a community and thus it need not face tradeoffs between school 
quality and house characteristics.  
 
3. THE AIDS MODEL 
  Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) are credited with constructing the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS). This model is derived from the consumer cost function 
corresponding to price-independent, generalized logarithmic consumer preferences. It 
converts individual household budget equations into aggregate budget shares that 
correspond to the decisions of a representative household, and it provides a first-order 
  5approximation to any demand system. Deaton and Muellbauer claim (1980: 315) that the 
parameter estimates from their model correspond to the weighted average of the 
parameter estimates of individual households. 
   In our study, we assume that consumers maximize utility by choosing a house in a 
particular community and a composite of other goods. The model assumes weak 
separability, this being equivalent to consumers maximizing utility derived from housing 
with a housing budget constraint and utility derived from other goods with its separate 
budget constraint. Thus, consumers maximize housing utility by choosing the 
“components” of housing. One of these components is the quality of public schooling, this 
dictated by the choice of residential neighborhood. Using the hedonic price model, we 
derive implicit prices of housing attributes including those of the community such as school 
quality. It is then possible to calculate the share of housing expenditures that public 
schooling consumes, this needed in the AIDS formulation. 
  More formally, if housing and other goods are separable,  
2) U = f [ VH (q1, q2,...qn), VX (qn+1, qn+2,...qz) ] 
where U is household utility, VH is household subutility associated with housing, VX is 
household subutility associated with other goods, q1 to qn are components of housing, and 
qn+1 to qz are components of other goods. Consumers maximize housing subutility subject 
to a housing budget constraint. The Marshallian subgroup demand for the i-th component 
of housing is: 
3) qi = gHi (eH, p1, p2,...pn)  i = 1,2,...n 
where eH is the expenditure on housing and the pi are the prices of the components of 
housing. Expenditures on housing are observed and we estimate the implicit prices of 
  6housing’s components using a hedonic house price model. The form of the house price 
hedonic is:  
4) ln eHjk = βΛjk + δΦk + εjk,  
where the j-th household’s expenditure on housing is eHjk, k represents the community 
selected by the household, Λ is a vector of house and lot characteristics, Φ represents 
community characteristics, and εjk is the error term.  
  Following Brown and Rosen (1982), we use 4) to calculate the implicit prices p1, 
p2,...pn of the components of housing.
4 Following Palmquist (1984), we adjust 
expenditures on housing to change the nonlinear budget constraint into a linear function 
so that the linearized budget constraint is tangent at the observed consumption point. Let 
cHjk denote adjusted expenditures on housing, so that 
5) cHjk = (1+tk) 
i
n
= ∑
1
(pijk*qijk). 
In 5), we account for the level of community taxes t that are levied to provide local public 
goods because the total expenditures on housing include local property taxes.
5 A 
community with a lower tax rate will yield higher household utility for a given expenditure 
on housing compared with a community with a higher tax rate. 
  The next step in the AIDS model is to calculate the budget shares, w, of the 
components of adjusted housing expenditure: 
6) wijk = (pijk*qijk) / cHjk. 
The budget shares form the dependent variables in the AIDS model. 
  AIDS is difficult to estimate in its non-linear form; therefore, we use the Stone price 
index to linearize the demand model in its parameters. Normally the index is derived in log 
  7form; however, due to the possibility of negative price terms in our formulation, we 
measure the Stone price index as:  
7) Pjk=   (w
i
n
= ∑
1
ijk*pijk). 
  AIDS models can be estimated as a system of equations with cross-equation 
restrictions; however, most studies that estimate a fully restricted AIDS system reject the 
cross-equation restrictions imposed on the model. If a system of demand equations is 
estimated using erroneous restrictions, the resulting parameter estimates are misleading. 
For this reason we focus our attention on estimating only the budget share equation for 
school quality. Following Deaton and Muellbauer, the form of demand equation in the 
AIDS model is]: 
8) wsjk = β1 log (cHjk/Pjk) + β2 log (τk) + 
i
n
= ∑
1
β3i log (pijk) + β4  zk + ε2 
where cHjk and Pjk are defined above and the other explanatory variables are defined as in 
the median voter model. Demand elasticities are calculated as in Bejranonda (1996), so 
that, for example, the own price elasticity of demand for schooling is  [(β3s - β1*ws)/ws] – 1, 
where ws is the budget share of public school quality. The cross-price elasticities are (β3i - 
β1*ws)/ws and the expenditure elasticity is (β1/ws) + 1. In this model, the income elasticity of 
demand for schooling is [(β1/ws) + 1] E(h,y), where E(h,y) is the income elasticity of 
demand for housing.  
 
4. DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION 
  8  The primary source of data for the hedonic house price regressions is a record of 
single family home purchases that occurred during 1991 in Ohio (Amerestate 1991). We 
focus on non-farm urban properties and thus any house with lot size greater than two 
acres is deleted. Houses that transact at prices above $400,000 ($1991) are deleted as 
being unrepresentative, and houses that transact for less than $10,000 are deleted 
because they likely are either uninhabitable or a gift between family members. In addition, 
properties that are outliers in square feet of housing and garage size are deleted. Any 
community with less than 17 house transactions is deleted for fear of not producing a 
reliable hedonic estimates. Our sample consists of 40,116 houses in 134 communities, 
and the mean deflated house value is $73,107.
6 The School District Data Book (MESA 
Group, 1994), the Ohio Department of Education, and the Office of Criminal Justice 
Services of the State of Ohio provide the remainder of the explanatory variables.  
  The first step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the implicit prices of 
community characteristics. We estimate six hedonic house price equations covering six 
Ohio MSAs. The results are listed in the appendix.
7 The hedonic estimations fit the data 
well and the explanatory variables have the expected signs. School quality is measured by 
the performance of a community’s students on a proficiency test that measures the 
percentage of students in each school district who pass all four sections of the statewide 
9th grade proficiency exam. Its coefficient is positive and significant implying a positive 
implicit price. Median community income, the level of safety, and the percent of white 
residents in a community all have positive implicit prices.  
The form of the median voter model is specified in 1). The dependent variable is 
the natural log of the school quality measure. Explanatory variables include the 
  9community’s median household income, the tax price of local public goods, the own price 
of school quality, the prices of other community attributes, and the set of RSR variables to 
capture the sorting of residents to desired public service levels. The RSR variables are a 
central city dummy tariable and the proportion of new residents. The central city dummy 
variable represents the resident’s lack of choice among public good bundles; people may 
sort to central cities for reasons not related to public good bundles, like convenient access 
to work. The proportion of residents who have lived in the community for less than six 
years is chosen to represent newcomers. Because newcomers have moved in recently, 
the level of public services provided is probably similar to the level that induced the 
residents to move to the community.  
Equation 8) indicates the form of the AIDS estimation. The dependent variable is 
the share of expenditures on housing devoted to schooling. Explanatory variables include 
the adjusted total expenditure on housing, the tax price, own price, prices of other 
community attributes, and the RSR variables. The sources, means, and definitions of the 
variables used in the school quality demand regressions are shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
5. DEMAND FOR EDUCATION ESTIMATION RESULTS 
  The regression results are shown in Table 2. Nearly all variables have statistically 
significant parameter estimates.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 3 converts the parameter estimates of Table 2 into in elasticities in order to more 
easily compare the estimates from the two models. 
  10[Insert Table 3] 
  Table 3 shows that the AIDS and median voter methods yield similar demand 
elasticities, regardless of whether RSR (1987) sorting variables are included or not. The 
estimate of the own price elasticity for school quality ranges from -0.66 to -0.52. This value 
is slightly larger than that found in prior research. The implication is that if school quality is 
capitalized into house prices, then residents of the community react by reducing their 
demand for schooling. Households also pay for school quality through higher taxes and 
taxes also generate a demand response with elasticity estimates ranging from -0.30 to -
0.05. Prior studies found tax elasticities of demand for schooling between -0.20 and  
-0.40 (Reiter and Weichenrieder, 1997). 
Our study is unique in that it analyzes the complements and substitutes for public 
schooling consumption.
8 We find that public schooling quality in a community is a 
substitute for high-income in that neighborhood. Our hedonic house price estimates 
indicate that high median income in a community is valued as an amenity and it increases 
the price of housing. Our demand for education estimates indicate that when it becomes 
more expensive to purchase a house in a high-income neighborhood, all else constant, 
households’ demand for public school quality increases. The magnitude of the effect is 
small, though, with elasticity estimates ranging from 0.005 to 0.2. We also find that public 
schooling and public safety are substitutes. Three of the four elasticities are positive. 
Again, the elasticity is small, the largest estimate being 0.14. The two models yield 
conflicting results regarding whether the racial composition of a community is a 
complement or a substitute for public school quality.  
  11  The median voter model yields a direct estimate of the income elasticity of demand 
for public school quality. We find the values are 0.46 to 0.57, higher than that found by 
RSR. The AIDS estimation yields an estimate of the “expenditure elasticity” of demand for 
school quality, ranging from 0.65 to 0.72. To convert this to an income elasticity of 
demand, we must multiply the expenditure elasticity by the income elasticity of demand for 
housing. This value is not directly estimated in the model but many estimates are reported 
in the literature. Their range is from about 0.5 to 1.0 depending on the concept of income 
used (Goodman and Kawai 1982). Thus, the AIDS model yields an estimate of the income 
elasticity of demand for school quality in the range of 0.3 to 0.7, corresponding closely with 
the median voter model estimate. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
  Communities, of course, differ in the bundle of amenities offered to residents. Less 
frequently acknowledged is that these amenities differ in rates of capitalization into house 
prices. For example, Brasington (2002b) found that there is an inverse relationship 
between the elasticity of housing supply and capitalization rates. Specifically, he found 
that the capitalization of schooling and crime was weaker toward the edge of an urban 
area where housing supply elasticities and developer activity are greater. Thus, the “entry 
price” into a community offering a particular bundle of schooling and other amenities 
varies over space not only because the bundle differs but also because the implicit prices 
of a community’s amenities differ. Households are faced with a choice of which bundle to 
select when they select their residence. This choice implies households make tradeoffs 
among the amenities; that is, the amenities are substitutes or complements in the usual 
  12sense. These demand relationships have not been estimated in prior studies. The cross-
price elasticities with respect to public schooling are particularly interesting because they 
reveal the tradeoffs households are willing to make among amenities.  
  We estimate the demand for public school quality. The implicit prices of amenities 
are generated from a hedonic house price estimation using a sample that consists of 
house-level data drawn from a large number of communities. We use these prices to 
estimate own and cross-price elasticities in two models—the traditional median voter 
model and the less frequently applied Almost Ideal Demand System model. The price and 
income elasticity estimates are quite similar in these models, yielding additional 
confidence about their validity. 
  We find the own price elasticity of demand for schooling is about -0.6 and an 
income elasticity of demand of 0.5. The cross-price elasticity between public safety and 
school quality is about 0.1 suggesting that public safety and school quality are weak 
substitutes. We also find the cross-price elasticity of demand between school quality and a 
household’s decision to locate in a high-income neighborhood is about 0.2. The only case 
where the models differ is the response to variations in the implicit price of a community’s 
racial composition, where the median voter model predicts they are substitutes and the 
AIDS model suggests they are complements. 
  Brasington’s (2002b) result that there tends to be little capitalization of amenities in 
suburbs far from the CBD suggests that these households do not face higher house prices 
when school quality is high. Thus, the price elasticity estimate of -0.6 has little effect on 
the quantity of school demanded in suburban areas. Further, these households do not 
have to face tradeoffs among community amenities because of the lower degree of 
  13capitalization. In contrast, capitalization is stronger in central cities and inner ring suburbs. 
In these areas, our results suggest that good public schools will result in higher house 
prices and households will respond by reducing their demand for high quality education. 
These differences in demand levels help to explain spatial differences in the observed 
levels of school quality. 
 
 
 
  14ENDNOTES
                                                           
1 Further, implementing the full two-step analysis as envisioned by Rosen (1974) 
is difficult, as noted by Brown and Rosen (1982). 
2 Data sets do not identify the median voter, so researchers must find proxies for 
the values of the explanatory variables of the median voter. 
3 Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) show that household sorting can bias 
estimates of demand elasticities in both micro level and aggregate data. They 
identify variables that are likely to affect sorting but not demand (1987: 432) such 
as the percentage of recent movers and a variable that indicates the amount of 
jurisdicational choice that is available. 
4 The implicit prices are the partial derivatives of house price with respect to each 
house characteristic. Here they equal the coefficient of an explanatory variable 
multiplied by the house value. Recent examples of the calculation of the implicit 
price of schooling from house price hedonics include Brasington (2000) and 
Brasington and Hite (2005). 
5 The adjustment is that the implicit price is multiplied by (1 + t) where t is the 
effective tax rate expressed in dollars. For example, a tax rate of 33 mills is 
33/1000 = $0.033. 
6 Dollar denominated variables are deflated (1991 base year) using cost of living 
estimates at the metropolitan statistical area level (ACCRA 1991, 1992).  
7 The variables’ names in the hedonic estimation are self explanatory. More 
details are available in Brasington (2002a). 
  15                                                                                                                                                               
8 Brasington and Hite (2005) investigate the complements and substitutes for the 
consumption of environmental quality.  
  16Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Means 
Variable AIDS  Model  Median Voter 
Mean  Model Mean
School Quality Share: wskj in 8). It is the share of expenditures on 
on housing devoted to schooling, calculated as in 6). 
0.043 
 
- 
School Quality: sk in 1). It is the percentage of students in each 
school district who passed all four sections of the 9th grade 
proficiency exam in 1990. 
- 31.6 
Own Price: Implicit price of school quality.  299 185 
Expenditure on Housing: cHjk/Pjk in 8). It is the adjusted 
transaction price of (i.e., expenditure on) housing divided by a price
index; in thousands of dollars. 
27.01 - 
Income: yk in 1). It is the median community income in thousands 
of dollars. 
- 39.1 
Price of Income: Implicit price of community income.  337 272 
Price of Race: Implicit price of the percent of community residents 
who are white 
28,199 26,908 
Price of Safety: Implicit price of lack of violent crimes.  10,623 10,354 
Tax Price: τk in 1) and 8). It is house value multiplied by the 
community property tax rate, divided by taxable property valuation 
per pupil. 
0.028 0.029 
Central City: A dummy variable, 1 if central city.  0.27 0.03 
Newcomer: Proportion of residents who have lived in the 
community for less than six years. 
0.47 0.45 
Number of observations for AIDS: 33,876.  
 
Number of observations for median voter model: 135.   
Table 2 
Demand for School Quality 
Variable  AIDS no RSR Median Voter 
no RSR 
AIDS yes RSR  Median Voter yes 
RSR 
Log Own Price  0.0147**  -0.56**  0.0207**  -0.53** 
Log Expenditure  -0.0125**  -  -0.0157**  - 
Log Median Income  -  0.57**  -  0.46** 
Log Price of Income  0.0050**  0.18**  0.0095**  0.20** 
Log Price of Race  -0.0050**  0.14*  -0.0107**  0.16** 
Log Price of Safety  0.0024**  0.14**  -0.0027**  0.14** 
Log Tax Price  -0.0136**  -0.05  -0.0141**  -0.11** 
Central City  -  -  -0.0134**  -0.23* 
Newcomer -  -  -0.0404**  0.85** 
Intercept -0.0470**  0.86*  0.0263**  0.40 
Adjusted R-square  0.45  0.77  0.57  0.79 
Parameter estimates are shown. ** = significant at 0.05, * = significant at 0.10. The 
dependent variable for the AIDS estimation is School Quality Share. The dependent variable 
for the median voter regression is School Quality. 
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Table 3 
Elasticities of Demand for School Quality  
Variable  AIDS no RSR Median Voter no 
RSR 
AIDS yes 
RSR 
Median Voter yes 
RSR 
Own Price  -0.66  -0.56    -0.52    -0.53   
Expenditure   0.72    -  0.65    - 
Median Income  -  0.57    -  0.46   
Price of Income  0.12    0.18    0.23    0.20   
Price of Race  -0.10    0.14   -0.22    0.16   
Price of Safety  0.07    0.14    -0.04    0.14   
Tax Price  -0.29    -0.05  -0.30    -0.11   
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Hedonic House Price Regression 
Variable Akron  Cincinnati  Cleveland  Columbus  Dayton  Toledo 
INTERCEPT  6.17** 8.04**  7.52** 7.49** 7.52**  5.95** 
AIR  CONDITIONING  0.08** 0.12** 0.054**  0.12** 0.13**  0.10** 
FIREPLACE  0.14** 0.16**  0.14** 0.19** 0.13**  0.16** 
LOT  SIZE  0.0016 0.016**  0.016** 0.034** 0.018**  0.032** 
LOT SIZE SQUARED  -0.2x10
-5 -0.17x10
-3 -0.21x10
-3** -0.46x10
-
3** 
-0.23x10
-3** -0.5x10
-3** 
AGE -0.0014  0.0070**  0.014**  -0.0002  0.0077**  0.028** 
AGE SQUARED  0.34x10
-4** -0.11x10
-4* -0.36x10
-4** 0.14x10
-4* -0.14x10
-4** -0.86x10
-4** 
ROOMS  0.19**  0.063** 0.10** 0.17** 0.18** 0.032** 
ROOMS  SQUARED  -0.010**  0.0014  -0.0036** -0.0074** -0.0082**  -0.011** 
GARAGE  0.22** 0.14**  0.21** 0.10** 0.26**  0.29** 
FULL  BATHROOMS  0.16** 0.12**  0.12** 0.13** 0.11**  0.21** 
PART  BATHROOMS  0.11**  0.028** 0.13** 0.10** 0.11**  0.15** 
DECK  0.032  0.052**  0.070** 0.046** 0.092**  0.083** 
POOL  0.042 0.034  0.028 0.078  0.086** 0.058 
Q2  0.044** 0.051**  0.062** 0.072** 0.050**  0.016 
Q3  0.049** 0.058**  0.065** 0.070** 0.043**  0.023 
Q4  0.054** 0.063**  0.066** 0.070** 0.039**  0.003 
INCOME  0.0049** 0.0033**  0.0058** 0.0057** 0.0057**  0.0039** 
LOG PROFICIENCY 
TEST SCORE 
0.30** 0.11**  0.14** 0.12**  0.072**  0.088 
DISTANCE  0.0037 0.011**  0.011** 0.028** 0.018**  0.014 
SAFETY 0.17  0.51**  0.14**  0.017  0.055  0.22 
PERCENT  WHITE  1.76** 0.16*  0.33** 0.63** 0.51**  0.20 
Number of 
observations 
2550 5240 13963  7602 6879  3882 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.68 0.71  0.66 0.60 0.70  0.74 
Parameter estimates are shown. **significant at .05, *significant at .10, otherwise statistically insignificant. 
Dependent variable is LOG HOUSE PRICE.  
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